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a  b  s  t r  a  c  t
Some  major  national  and international  tobacco  control  organisations  favour  mandating  a  reduction  in
nicotine content  of cigarettes  to non-addictive  levels  as  a  tobacco  control  tool.  Reducing  nicotine  content,
it  is argued,  will  make  tobacco  smoking  less  attractive.  The  2009  U.S.  Food  and  Drug  Administration’s
regulation  of  cigarettes  appears  to have  the  power  to reduce  nicotine  to non-addictive  levels  provided  it
is not  taken  to zero.  A  consideration  of the  U.S.  context,  however,  raises  doubts  about  (a) whether  this
will  ever  be practicable  and  (b),  if practicable,  how  long  it will  take  to implement.  Current  versions  of
the  nicotine-reducing  strategy  propose  the  systematic,  incentivised  use  of  less  harmful  nicotine/tobaccoobacco use
lectronic cigarettes
pidemiology
olicy
egulation
products  as  elements  of the  mandatory  cigarette  nicotine-reduction  strategy.  Time  will  tell  if  and  when
mandatory  nicotine  reduction  in tobacco  cigarettes  will  occur  and  what  impact  it might  have on smoking
prevalence.  The  question  posed  here  is  “Why  wait?”  Resources  used  in  implementing  reduction  in  nico-
tine  content  have  an  opportunity  cost.  In the  meantime,  nicotine-maintaining  harm  reduction  strategies
can  have  nearer  term  effects  on  tobacco  use  as  an  individual  and a  public  health  issue.
ublis©  2015  The  Author.  P
he low-nicotine cigarette strategy
An innovative proposal made in 1994 (Benowitz & Henningﬁeld,
994) to mandate sales only of non-addictive, low-nicotine
obacco cigarettes has had a dominant place in cigarette endgame
trategies and is encouraged by the American Medical Associ-
tion, the British Medical Association, the U.S. Food and Drug
dministration (FDA) and the U.S. Surgeon-General (Benowitz &
enningﬁeld, 2013; Hatsukami, Benowitz, Donny, Henningﬁeld,
 Zeller, 2013; National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention
nd Health Promotion, 2014). The WHO  framework convention
n tobacco control (FCTC) is also supportive (Gray & Borland,
013). Part of the appeal of the non-addictive cigarette may  be
ts direct attack on addiction (Kozlowski, 2013), and its elimina-
ion of “gateway” issues by removing conventional cigarettes as a
roduct option. Research agendas for reduced-nicotine have been
roposed (Donny et al., 2014; Gray & Borland, 2013). In its full form
he proposal argues for research, government regulation, grad-
al reduction, consumer education, and increased availability of
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2015.02.001
955-3959/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article unhed  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
lower-risk options (Benowitz & Henningﬁeld, 2013). The 2009
United States FDA tobacco law makes the strategy seem within
reach by including the authority to reduce nicotine in cigarettes,
provided levels are not taken to “zero” and by creating resources
for research (United States Code, 2009).
The proposal has been criticised (e.g., Jarvis & Bates, 1999;
Joossens & Hayes, 1999; Shatenstein, 1999), but overall there has
been enthusiastic, high-level support. This article argues that exam-
ination of the U.S. situation shows that (a) the strategy may  not be
practicable, given other provisions of the FDA law and centrality of
addictive-levels of nicotine to the popularity of cigarettes and (b),
if practicable, it will likely take many years to implement. Optional
low-nicotine cigarettes are expected to continue to exist with small
markets, but failing to require such cigarettes would represent sig-
niﬁcant failure for the strategy. There are substantial opportunity
costs from resources committed to a strategy that could be imprac-
ticable or in the distant future, rather than to other product-focused
strategies that may  be more practical, involving pleasurable, safer
forms of nicotine use such as vaping (electronic cigarettes) or some
smokeless tobaccos such as snus (Royal College of Physicians, 2007,
2014).FDA regulation
Since 2009, the FDA Act “. . . aims to curb the trend of new users
becoming addicted before they are old enough to understand the
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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isks and ultimately dying too young of tobacco-related diseases,”
U.S Food and Drug Administration, 2013b) and regulations are
narrowly tailored” to restrict promotion to youth, “while afford-
ng tobacco manufacturers and sellers ample opportunity to convey
nformation about their products to adult consumers” (Sec 2–32).
DA law protects cigarettes by (a) forbidding banning (b) specify-
ng that a consideration in requiring product changes is creation of
ontraband markets, and (c) sheltering cigarettes from competing
arketing of less-dangerous products by means of an expensive
valuation process with broad, difﬁcult-to-measure requirements
hat new products should not have negative population effects.
DA law compels evaluation of the nicotine-reduction strategy.
icotine-manipulated cigarettes have been purchased for research,
nd $2.5 million allocated for year one of a 5-year research project
n low-nicotine cigarettes (Wilson, 2011a). A well-funded research
omain, “Tobacco Regulatory Science,” has burgeoned within the
ational Institutes of Health (NIH) from manufacturer fees paid to
DA (Leischow, Zeller, & Backinger, 2012) that fund, e.g., 14 Tobacco
enters of Regulatory Science at $270 million over 5 years (U.S Food
nd Drug Administration, 2013a).
The FDA succeeded in banning ﬂavoured cigarettes (but not
enthol in cigarettes). The FDA also succeeded in banning “light”
nd “mild” brand descriptors, however the products themselves did
ot change and colour-coding can still guide consumers (Connolly
 Alpert, 2014). The “lighter” products also are associated with a
ilder taste that still can contribute to consumers perceiving them
s less dangerous than stronger cigarettes (Kozlowski & O’Connor,
002).
One explicit strategy in FDA law was advanced in 2011 and
equired colour graphic warning labels (Campaign for Tobacco-Free
ids, 2014); however, the industry prevented this in court (Wilson,
011b), and the FDA in the end abandoned further legal review.
ne issue inﬂuencing the ruling was the government’s own cost-
eneﬁt analysis (obligatory for all federal agencies) in which “lost
leasure” to smokers was included as a signiﬁcant “cost” of regu-
ation (Chaloupka, Gruber, & Warner, 2014; Song, Brown, & Glantz,
014). At present, no graphic warnings are required, and creating
abels preserving ‘freedom of commercial speech’ issues will take
ore research and probably meet further lawsuits. In another law-
uit on product regulation, the judge ordered that FDA reconstitute
ts advisory committee because of conﬂict-of-interest issues and
arred use of ﬁndings on menthol cigarettes (Rosenberg, 2014). It
s clear that unwelcome FDA actions will be opposed by industry
nd can lead to blocking of FDA actions.
hallenges to Mandating low-nicotine cigarettes
Despite the weight of optimistic ofﬁcial support, several factors
rgue that required low-nicotine cigarettes may  not be achiev-
ble or will be problematic because of the years it would take to
mplement. The issue is not whether low-nicotine cigarette will be
arketed. They have been, are, and likely will continue to be mar-
eted. The doubt is whether or when they can become the only
egal cigarette on the market, no matter what is written in one part
f a complex law.
Cigarettes with low nicotine-content tobacco have been tried
ommercially with very limited success (Dunsby & Bero, 2004).
ome failures could have been caused by removal of too much
icotine or by early processes used to reduce nicotine having taste
ssues. Overall, tobacco addiction experts would expect that low-
icotine content cigarettes would disappoint many smokers, given
ompensatory smoking that occurs with conventional “lower-
ield” cigarettes containing plenty of nicotine (e.g., National Cancer
nstitute, 2001). Nicotine has long been recognized as a central com-
onent of cigarette smoking (e.g., Henningﬁeld & Fant, 1999). Fromf Drug Policy 26 (2015) 543–547
2003 to 2009 Quest® cigarettes were marketed with three different
nicotine levels (Becker, Rose, & Albino, 2008; Catanzaro et al., 2007;
Cobb, Weaver, & Eissenberg, 2010; Hammond & O’Connor, 2014;
Paradise, 2013; Parascandola, Augustson, O’Connell, & Marcus,
2009; Penetar, Lindsey, Peters, Juliano, & Lukas, 2012; Perkins
& Karelitz, 2013; Shadel et al., 2006; Strasser, Lerman, Sanborn,
Pickworth, & Feldman, 2007; Strasser, O’Connor, Mooney, &
Wileyto, 2006; Strasser, Tang, Tuller, & Cappella, 2008; Walker
et al., 2011). These cigarettes employed the same patented pro-
cesses (owned by 22nd century group) to genetically-alter nicotine
in tobacco that is used in the cigarettes supplied to NIH. Analysts
wrote: “A large tobacco company spent $25 M on advertising for
Quest-branded modiﬁed nicotine cigarettes, before giving up on
the product” (Seeking Alpha, 2014). Other reviewers have noted
these cigarettes were not popular (McNeill, Hammond, & Gartner,
2012).
Altria (owner of Philip Morris USA) supported the 2009 legisla-
tion (Wilson, 2009b). In contrast, Philip Morris led opposition in a
$40 million campaign against a previous bill (Wilson, 2009a). Cor-
porate responsibilities stress increasing proﬁts rather than losing
proﬁts. Altria helped write the successful bill (Wilson, 2009a) and
surely assessed long-term prospects for litigation and implemen-
tation.
Consider how consumers and sellers of caffeinated coffee/tea,
cannabis (in Colorado or Oregon in the U.S. where legal), or bever-
age alcohol would react to proposals to reduce drug levels to “above
zero,” but low psycho-activity levels. It would be treated as a pro-
hibition of the “real” product and an unfair alteration of a popular
product. Interestingly, alcohol prohibition in the U.S. was funda-
mentally a low-alcohol proposal directed at “intoxicating liquors.”
Many Americans were said to have expected that beer and wine
would still be allowed, and were shocked when the Volstead Act
deﬁned “intoxicating liquors” as anything with >5% alcohol in keep-
ing with tax laws (Goodwin, 2014).
Companies could ﬁght (within the FDA law) on grounds that it
constitutes de facto banning of cigarettes. There is also the question
of how “not-zero” nicotine should be deﬁned – as a chemical test
or having enough nicotine to function as a traditional cigarette.
What judgments will be applied to contraband markets (of con-
cern to both FDA law and the industry)? Analyses for warning
labels weighed “lost pleasure” to former and would-be smokers
(Chaloupka et al., 2014); such analyses here could also estimate
“lost pleasure” to current smokers. Major corporations can inﬂu-
ence government. Political makeup of the Congress can also change
future FDA regulation. (Congressional leaders, e.g., are now “push-
ing back on pending regulations” on e-cigarettes (Nelson, 2014).)
Yes, but the companies don’t always get what they want
Of course, tobacco companies have had to deal with regulations
they don’t like. They have opposed tax increases on their prod-
ucts, but such increases have been implemented. The cigarette
companies may  be reassured by the price-elasticity of cigarettes,
and they also often have ways to decrease prices to consumers.
Though increased taxes are an effective tobacco control strategy,
they also contribute to a government’s “dependence” on the con-
tinued sale of tobacco as a source of revenue (Gilmore, Tavakoly,
Taylor, & Reed, 2013; Golden, Ribisl, & Perreira, 2014; Jiang & Ling,
2013). The mandatory nicotine-reduction strategy may  be different
in that it is a direct adulteration of the product. Higher taxes, public
smoking bans, banning of light/mild descriptors may be tolerable
by the industry largely because the desirable, psychoactive, addic-
tive product is unchanged. (By analogy, consumers will pay high
prices for highly-taxed Scotch, but probably wouldn’t if the Scotch
had only low levels of alcohol.) Reducing nicotine to non-addictive
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evels is likely to be a make or break issue for the industry, because
igniﬁcant, psychoactive levels of nicotine that can lead to addic-
ion have been a central feature historically of all successful tobacco
roducts (Kozlowski, 1982).
f practicable, it is still years from implementation
Many experts will maintain optimism for the low-nicotine strat-
gy, but they should agree that, if it does happen, it would easily
e 5, 10, or many more years off. Beyond delays caused by the
ntrinsically slow process of development of formal regulations
nd processing comments on them (and legal challenges), there
ould be delays from a gradual phase-down of nicotine. Compa-
ies could occupy years of testing effects of (and safety of) various
echniques for creating low-nicotine tobacco, if they don’t want to
mploy the current patented process for nicotine reduction. Also,
arallel implementation of low-nicotine cigar requirements would
e needed and require research (and it would also be fought). And
he FDA does not yet have jurisdiction over cigars. Many disap-
ointed cigarette smokers would switch to cigars (little or big)
s has happened with changes in differential taxes (Government
ccountability Ofﬁce, 2012; Warner & Pollack, 2014). At 480,000
nnual premature deaths (Centers for Disease Control, 2014) from
moking, years of delay for a nicotine-reduction strategy to take
ffect could have grave mortality effects.
rgent need for support of reduced harm products
Combustibles are by far the most harmful tobacco prod-
cts (National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health
romotion, 2014; Royal College of Physicians, 2007). Nicotine in
oses typically ingested by tobacco users is not harmless but
onsiderably less harmful than tobacco smoke (Royal College of
hysicians, 2007). The nicotine-reduction strategy has endorsed
he use of less harmful tobacco/nicotine products, supported
y differential tax incentives, in concert with the implementa-
ion of mandatory nicotine-reduction in cigarettes (Benowitz &
enningﬁeld, 2013). Products like snus and e-cigarettes would
ualify as signiﬁcant harm-reduction products (Hajek, Etter,
enowitz, Eissenberg, & McRobbie, 2014; Kozlowski, 2007).
Clearly, there are complexities in that the tobacco industry
ay  seek to hijack the harm reduction approach paradoxically to
romote greater use of combustible tobacco. However, the policy
hallenges to addressing these may  be inherently more tractable
han trying to force the industry to ruin their core product. Attempts
o undermine this kind of harm reduction approach by trying to
islead the public and policy makers about the harms of smoke-
ess tobacco and electronic cigarettes can play into the hands of
he tobacco industry by fostering business as usual for deadly
igarettes.
The American Heart Association’s recent policy on electronic-
igarettes speculates that e-cigarettes might be a useful substitute
or cigarettes once FDA’s low-nicotine cigarette strategy, cou-
led with higher taxes on cigarettes, pushes smokers away from
igarettes, but they note: “. . . it remains unclear whether society
ould be accepting of recreational nicotine addiction if associ-
ted with minimal health consequences” (Bhatnagar et al., 2014).
uch speculation resonates with irony: Society currently tolerates
ddictive and deadly cigarettes! (Gallup, 2014). But more impor-
antly, one wonders why it is important to wait for the mandatory
ow-nicotine cigarette. The evidence on snus as a reduced harm
roduct is clear (Scientiﬁc Committee on Emerging and Newly
dentiﬁed Health Risks, 2008). The Swedish experience of snus
emonstrates that it is possible to avoid a gateway from snus to
igarettes (Scientiﬁc Committee on Emerging and Newly Identiﬁed Drug Policy 26 (2015) 543–547 545
Health Risks, 2008), but the marketing of the relative dangers of
snus and cigarettes may  be a key part of this (Lund & Scheffels,
2014) as well as differential costs. The population does need to be
informed about the relative risks of different products (Kozlowski
& Edwards, 2005; Meier & Shelley, 2006).
Limiting sales to only low-reinforcement cigarettes are a “stick”
to beat consumers to alternative nicotine-delivery systems. It could
be better to support less dangerous “carrot” like e-cigarettes and
vaping products with substantial nicotine that could attract smok-
ers away from cigarettes. The growing “voluntary” sales of vaping
products with ample nicotine levels suggests this is happening
(Friedman, 2014). Standard marketing principles (the 4-Ps: price,
promotion, product, place (Goi, 2009; Dewhirst & Lee, 2012)) can
be used to support the movement from cigarettes to these prod-
ucts. If cigarettes were to lose to competitors in the marketplace,
this would avoid some of the challenges of trying to impose gov-
ernmental regulations.
The movement to low-nicotine cigarettes has become part of
tobacco endgame projections (Daynard, 2013; Warner & Pollack,
2014), and is supported by an FCTC article and FDA regulation. A
scientiﬁcally-reasoned plan for requiring low-nicotine cigarettes
does have comforting features that could allay tobacco control
concerns. Imagine a well-controlled world of educated, well-
comported consumers with no gateway fears because of the
elimination of the deadly, addictive, pleasurable product that is
the gateway terminus. This hypothetical world contains mostly
safe, pharmaceutically-vetted products used almost exclusively
by adults and with only inconsequentially small black markets.
Research on moral psychology has shown that, when there are vio-
lations of a sense of community standards and respect for authority,
the emotional responses of disgust and contempt are triggered
(Kozlowski, 2013). This hypothetical world is one where the moral
psychological responses of disgust of and contempt for the state of
affairs would be low.
However, youth has been the time of recruitment to many prod-
ucts forbidden to youth. In 2013 (Johnston, O’Malley, Schulenberg,
& Miech, 2014), 39% of U.S. high school seniors reported some
alcohol use in the past 30 days and 26% reported having been
drunk; 16% of seniors reported smoking a cigarette in the past
month. (And 23% of 12th graders reported marijuana/hashish use
in the past 30 days which is not yet legal for most adults in the
United States.) Will adventurous youth sneak ersatz cigarettes or
the “hard stuff”? (Youth can prefer the “hard stuff” for alcohol
(Siegel, Naimi, Cremeens, & Nelson, 2011)). A contrasting hypo-
thetical worldview would see less orderly behaviour in the use
of multiple recreational substances, along with great corporate
Leviathans ruling commercial seas, and with susceptible govern-
ments with complex, self-contradictory, imperfectly-enforceable
laws, and a populace, whether young or old, that wants what the
populace wants, whether from black or grey or white markets.
Even if one’s worldview lies between these caricatures, one
should consider whether or when the intellectual and ﬁnancial
investments in the low-nicotine content strategy will pay off. No
matter FCTC or FDA, any government lacking the power to ban
cigarettes may  in effect lack the power to ban addictive levels of
nicotine in cigarettes. Product-focused tobacco control should be
actively working to minimize harm from tobacco products in order
to deal with the cigarette health emergency (Sweanor, Alcabes, &
Drucker, 2007), while the popular strategy of mandatory cigarette
nicotine reduction is being pursued. Should that strategy material-
ize down the road, it will likely face a smaller cigarette market.Financial disclosure
No ﬁnancial disclosures to report.
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